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We present a device-independent quantum scheme for the Byzantine Generals problem. The
protocol is for three parties. Party C is to send two identical one bit messages to parties A and B.
The receivers A and B may exchange two one bit messages informing the other party on the message
received from C. A bit flipping error in one of the transmissions, does not allow the receiving parties
to establish what was the message of C. Our quantum scheme has the feature that if the messages of
the Byzantine protocol are readable (that is give an unambiguous bit value for any of the receivers),
then any error by C (cheating by one of the commanding general) is impossible. A and B do not
have to exchange protocol messages to be sure of this.
Quantum Mechanics (QM) allows to encode and pro-
cess information in ways inaccessible to classical theories
with non-contextual hidden variables. One such strictly
quantum resource is entanglement, a phenomenon in
which individual parts of a quantum system can be de-
scribed only in reference the other ones. There are multi-
ple consequences of entanglement. The fundamental one
is the exclusion of theories with local hidden variables
(LHVTs, where non-contextuality is justified by spatial
separation). The practical ones are advantages in various
communication tasks, as compared to classical protocols.
Examples of such advantage include security of crypto-
graphic key distribution or secret sharing, or communi-
cation complexity reduction in a distributed computing
system.
A procedure, in which quantum correlations can also
be useful, deal with faults of components of a vast com-
puting network. A reliable distributed computing system
must be able to cope with a failure of some of its com-
ponents. A failing component can behave arbitrarily and
may send conflicting information to different parts of the
computing system.
The abstract formulation of the problem is put in a
form of generals of the Byzantine Army communicat-
ing with each other. The commanding general C (say,
Clausevitz) first sends a message (mC) to A (for Alexan-
der) and B (for Buonaparte) whether to attack or re-
treat. Next, A and B exchange the messages to confirm
what they received. The generals must reach a consen-
sus among themselves based on the messages exchanged
[1, 2]. The problem is complicated by the fact that one
(and only one) of the players can be traitor. He may try
to convince the loyal general(s) for malevolent action by
sending corrupt message. The solution to the problem
must allow (i) all the loyal generals to agree upon a com-
mon plan of action. Also, (ii) if the commanding general
is loyal then all the loyal generals must obey the order
he sends. In more mundane terms Byzantine Agreement
(BA) is about information transmission. An electronic
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device C should send two identical bits to devices A and
B, but there might be a bit-flipping error (which causes
the messages to be different). A gets a confirmation bit
from B which is to inform what was the value received by
B from C. However also in this transfer there may be a
bit flipping error in the transmission form A to B. Simi-
larly B gets from A a bit which is supposed to be the one
received by A form C, but there might be an error in the
transmission. How can A know that the possible discrep-
ancy of the messages from B and C, which A received,
is due to an error by B or by C? The same applies to
B, which device sent a bit-flipped message C or A (that
is, which device is faulty)? However, C is the controlling
unit, therefore A must act according to C’s message, if
its message was identical to A and B (a correct operation
of C). The same applies to B. The assumption of just
one error is motivated by the fact that double errors are
rare.
The BA problem is about faulty transmission, not fail-
ure of transmission. Therefore, any attempt of jam-
ming/cutting the communication link for any players
leads to a different problem other than BA. In other
words, prevention against jamming/cutting does not lie
in the scope of this problem. One should also notice that
the BA problem is not a cryptographic problem and in
the standard case at most one traitor is assumed.
It was shown that an unconditionally secure scheme
for the BA problem is probably unsolvable by means of
classical resources only [1–4]. However, a partial quan-
tum solution was suggested in Ref. [5–11] in which the
condition (ii) had to be compromised to (ii’): all loyal
generals either follow the same plan, or abort any ac-
tion. This modification of the original problem is known
as detectable Byzantine agreement (DBA) or detectable
broadcast [5, 10]. Here, we present a secure protocol
for the original BA problem. Our protocol is based on
Hardy’s paradox [12], which disproves the possibility of
having a LHVTs description of quantum correlations like
Bell [13], but without inequalities.
Let us begin with recalling the original Hardy ‘para-
dox’ [12]. Consider a bipartite system and a choice of two
local observables Ux andDx, where (x = 1, 2) denotes the
2systems, with outcomes ±1. Let P (y1, y2|Y1, Y2) denote
the joint probability that the measurements (Y1, Y2) gave
the results (y1, y2). Hardy noticed that the following four
conditions can be satisfied, for some q and some quantum
states:
P (−1,−1|D1, D2) = 0.
P (+1,+1|D1, U2) = 0,
P (+1,+1|U1, D2) = 0,
P (+1,+1|U1, U2) = q > 0, (1)
However, this set of conditions cannot be satisfied in
LHVTs, and therefore by any separable state. In these
theories, the last condition of (1) says that each of the
subsystems can yield result “+1” under measurement U .
In such a case, the second and the third condition of
(1) tell us that the subsystems will yield “−1” under D,
which is in contradiction with the first condition. How-
ever, these conditions can be met by entangled states
[12].
Let us find state ρ, for which the conditions for Hardy-
type argument given in (1) are satisfied for given two
pairs of observables (Uk, Dk), k = 1, 2. Denote by
|x〉 and |x⊥〉 eigenstates of a Pauli-type observable X
with eigenvalues +1 and −1, respectively. Using such
notation, any state, which satisfies conditions (1), has
to be orthogonal to the following three product states
|φ0〉 = | d⊥1 〉| d⊥2 〉, |φ1〉 = |u1〉| d2〉 and |φ2〉 = | d1〉|u2〉
associated with the three zero probabilities of (1) and is
non-orthogonal to |φ3〉 = |u1〉|u2〉 associated with the
non-zero probability of (1).
|φ0〉, |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 span a three-dimensional subspace
S. Therefore, to satisfy the conditions (1), a state has
to be confined to an one dimensional subspace S⊥ of
C2 ⊗ C2, which is orthogonal to S. Therefore, ρ must be
a unique, pure and entangled [14]. We shall denote it
as |ψH〉. The four product states {|φi〉}3i=0 are linearly
independent, hence by Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization
procedure one can find a basis {|φ′i〉}3i=0, in which the
Hardy state |ψH〉 = |φ′3〉 is its last member:
|φ′0〉 = |φ0〉, |φ′i〉 =
|φi〉 −
∑i−1
j=0〈φ′j |φi〉|φ′j〉√
1−∑i−1j=0 |〈φ′j |φi〉|2
, i = 1, 2, 3.
(2)
As Dj 6= Uj , one must have
| dj〉 = αj |uj〉+ βj |u⊥j 〉, | d⊥j 〉 = β∗j |uj〉 − α∗j |u⊥j 〉, (3)
with |αj |2 + |βj |2 = 1 and 0 < |αj | < 1, for j = 1, 2.
Thus, the probability q in the conditions (1) reads
q = |〈ψ|φ3〉|2 = 1−
2∑
i=0
|〈φ′i|φ3〉|2 =
|α1α2|2|β1β2|2
1− |α1α2|2 .
Its maximum possible value is 5
√
5−11
2
for |α1| = |α2| =√√
5−1
2
[15].
Let us define the unique Hardy state by |ψ∗〉 for which
q achieves its maximum value. A recent result by Rabelo
et.al. [16], tells us that, for qmax =
5
√
5−11
2
the state of
of any systems is equivalent to |ψ∗〉12 ⊗ | η〉1′2′ , where
| η〉1′2′ is an arbitrary bipartite junk state for some other
systems. State |ψ∗〉12 is unique, and any expansion of
the Hilbert spaces of local systems leads to a factorisable
extension.
Therefore, Hardy conditions with qmax constitute a de-
vice independent test uniquely pinpointing |ψ∗〉12 as re-
sponsible for the correlations. Note that the value of q
is determined by the choice of local observables used to
define the Hardy conditions, and so is the state.
Protocol for Byzantine Agreement: Let the command-
ing general C send a one bit message mC to two gen-
erals, A and B. Let us denote mCA and mCB the bits
received by A and B, respectively (they will be the BA
protocol bits, all other information exchange to transmit
these is treated as auxiliary). After receiving the mes-
sage bit (mCG), the general G, where G = A,B, sends
bit mGR (G 6= R = A,B) to the other general R to
inform about the message (mCG) he received from C.
In a three-party BA problem at most one player can be
traitor. So, if mAB = mBA, then all three players are
loyal and there is no problem in Byzantine agreement.
But if, mAB 6= mBA, then one of the general (from gen-
erals A,B and C) must be a traitor. The main goal of
this problem is to find out the traitor. In order to accom-
plish this, we propose a quantum scheme which based on
some novel features of Hardy paradox. One should note
that there is an asymmetry in the problem. C is the com-
manding general, he just sends the messages and not re-
ceives any (protocol) messages from A and B. Whereas,
the roles of A and B are symmetric. They receive as well
as send messages. Also, both A and B (at least the loyal
one) are interested to know who is the traitor in contrast,
C is not. Cheating by C is sending two different messages
to A and B. Whereas, cheating by A is sending to B a
message which is opposite to the one he received from
C. Like A, we have a symmetric definition of cheating
by B. All classical ‘protocol messages’ are only sent by
C, while A and B exchange confirming messages between
themselves only. There is some non protocol, auxiliary,
information which may be sent to C, to test and operate
the quantum links only. What is important we assume
that C sends the classical messages to A and B on his
decision retreat/attacks using only quantum communica-
tion methods. As we shall see, this does not need to be
the case for the message exchange between A and B.
Our quantum scheme for BA problem consists with
two symmetric sub-protocols one for A and another for
B. Both A and B prepare as well as distribute the neces-
sary resources for their part of the protocol. Due to the
symmetry, here we describe only A’s part of the protocol
in detail.
Let us begin with the part of the protocol which is done
on qubits distributed by A. The goals of A’s protocol are:
1. to allow C to send the message mCB to B,
32. to allow A to check what was the message C sent
to B.
S1: Distribution of resources: For simplicity, consider
UA = UB = UC = U and DA = DB = DC = D as
the protocol settings. In the bases related with the
U -measurements, the Hardy state given in Eq. (2),
can be written as,
|ψH〉 = x00|u〉1|u〉2 + x01(|u〉1|u⊥〉2
+ |u⊥〉1|u〉2) + x11|u⊥〉1|u⊥〉2,
(4)
where, x00 =
|αβ|2√
1−|α|4 , x01 = −
α∗β|α|2√
1−|α|4 , and x11 =
−α
∗2β2
√
1−|α|4
|αβ|2 , with α1 = α2 = α and β1 = β2 =
β.
Initially, A shares a large number of copies of
two-qubit maximally entangled states |Φ+〉 =
1√
2
[|uu〉 + |u⊥u⊥〉], say, 6N with both B and C.
Each general keeps the record of his qubits, by writ-
ing down detection times, settings and results.
a: Conversion of |Φ+〉 to |ψH〉: A randomly se-
lects 4N copies of |Φ+〉, 2N shared with B
and 2N shared with C and prepares one an-
cilla qubit |u〉a for each selected copy. Next,
A applies a two-qubit unitary operation U on
each pair (an ancilla and his system qubit, for
a randomly selected copy of |Φ+〉).
(Ua1⊗I2)|u〉a|Φ+〉12 = 1√
2
[|u〉a|ψH〉12 + |u⊥〉a|ψ′〉12
]
,
(5)
where
U|uu〉 = x00|uu〉+ x01|uu⊥〉+ x∗01|u⊥u〉+ x∗11|u⊥u⊥〉,
U|uu⊥〉 = x01|uu〉+ x11|uu⊥〉 − x∗00|u⊥u〉 − x∗01|u⊥u⊥〉
and
|ψ′〉 = x∗01|uu〉 − x∗00|uu⊥〉+ x∗11|u⊥u〉 − x∗01|u⊥u⊥〉.
After this, A measures each ancilla in basis
{|u〉〈u |, |u⊥〉〈u⊥ |} and discards the runs 1
(say R1) with measurement outcome |u⊥〉. If
the outcome is |u〉 (which can happen with
probability 1
2
), the corresponding maximally
entangled state shared between A and B, or
C, collapses to a shared Hardy state |ψH〉.
b: Creation of Hardy state |ψH〉 between B and
C: From the remaining 8N copies of |Φ+〉,
A randomly selects and prepares 4N pairs
of copies {|Φ+〉12, |Φ+〉34}, such that in each
pair the first |Φ+〉12 is shared between A and
1 each run associated with each copy of the entangled state.
B and the second |Φ+〉34 between A and C.
Qubits ‘1’ and ‘3’ are in A’s hand for each
such pair of copies. A applies a two outcome
joint measurement {M, I r M} on her two
qubits for each such selected pair of copies
{|Φ+〉12, |Φ+〉34}. Here, M = |ψH∗〉〈ψH∗|
with
|ψH∗〉 = x∗00|uu〉+ x∗01
(|uu⊥〉+ |u⊥u〉)+ x∗11|u⊥u⊥〉.
In the measurement, if M clicks (which
can happen with probability 1
4
), the asso-
ciated pair of maximally entangled states
{|Φ+〉12, |Φ+〉34} collapses to a Hardy state
|ψH〉 shared between B and C:
(M13 ⊗ I24)|Φ+〉12|Φ+〉34 = 1
2
|ψH∗〉13 ⊗ |ψH〉24.
A discards those runs (say, R2) where mea-
surement outcome was not M .
The runs R3 = {R1}
⋃
R2 are discarded. and they
are totally useless for rest of the protocol. This
list is distributed among the generals. Each of the
party receives approximately 2N (2N≈, for short-
hand) qubits and consequently each pair of parties
shared N≈ copies of |ψH〉 between them. Neither
B nor C can know which of his qubits (from their
own 2N≈-qubits) were entangled with A’s qubits
and which of them were entangled with the other
one of the pair, while A has full knowledge about
the correlation links of all 3N≈ pairs of qubits i.e.,
all 3N≈ copies of |ψH〉.
S2: The actual actions on qubits distributed by A: As
said earlier A makes measurements in random U
andD bases (test settings) on all of her 2N≈-qubits
form shared Hardy states (with B and C), so does
B. Whereas C, if he wants the protocol to run is to
make, say, 75% of their randomly chosen measure-
ments in the message basis (in a prearranged man-
ner), and the rest in random bases (test settings).
C chooses basis U for the message ‘m = 0/Yes’ or
D for ‘m = 1/No’. They announce their results
(not settings) of all runs, immediately after each
measurement. Let L and L1 be the lists of runs
where C have chosen the measurements in message
basis and random bases accordingly. Before going
to next step C sends the list L/L1 to both A and
B.
Note: An important requirement of the protocol is that
generals B and C make their protocol measure-
ments immediately after they receive qubits. This
can be forced by requesting A,B and C to an-
nounce the results, not settings, immediately, for
each run in a random sequence, so the each partner
has probability 1/3 to be first to announce. General
A does his protocol measurements after his prepa-
ration measurements (swappings, projections), in
4a sequential manner. In the case of entanglement
swapping run A does not have to make measure-
ments of his leftover qubits, but should nevertheless
announce some ‘phony’ results, say random. All
this is to preclude delayed choice operation of any
of the partners, and to hide, at results revealing
stage, who was connected with whom. Addition-
ally, there is no need to “store” the qubits. This
makes the protocol more feasible.
S3: Convey classical message through measurement set-
tings: After receiving the list L/L1 and measure-
ment results from C, A can easily find out the mes-
sage basis of C. Hence, he can read the messages
mCB. A checks for what choice of uniform measure-
ment setting (U/D) on C’s side the measurement
data of all the correlated qubit pairs between him
and C from L has no contradiction with Hardy’s
conditions (1). If C sends consistent data there
must be one uniform setting for L and that setting
represents the message mCB.
Next A reveals to B and C which runs were con-
necting whom i.e., the correlation links2 for all
Hardy states. A cannot cheat in this because this
would lead to no transmission ofmCB. However, C
does not know before making measurements with
whom he was connected. So, he has no option
other than choosing the same message settings all
the time, if he wants to send a consistent (read-
able) message to B. Otherwise communication of
the BA protocol bit mCB fails. Recall, that A re-
veals the links, only after measurement results are
announced by all parties.
S4: Upon knowing the correlation links with C’s qubits,
B can easily read the message mCB by verifying
Hardy’s conditions for the correlated qubits pairs
he shared with C from list L. Like A, B also checks
for what choice of uniform setting between U and
D on C’s side the measurement data for all these
correlated qubits from L satisfy the Hardy’s condi-
tions 1. If the links revealed by A are genuine and C
are honest then the measurement data will be con-
sistent for one of the choices of a uniform setting
(say, V ∈ {U,D}). Hence, he can read the message
mCB = V . B and C can check whether they were
indeed sharing Hardy states with A and themselves
(also A sent them the correct correlation links) by
exchanging their measurement results and settings,
as part of the settings are test settings. They can
also ask A to send his settings and results to test
whether the Hardy’s correlations they shared with
A are genuine or not. If the shared Hardy states
are all genuine then the measurement data for each
2 Position and parties information of each pair of correlated qubits
associated to a Hardy state shared between X and Y.
pair of correlated qubits agree with Hardy’s condi-
tions (1).
S5: The actual actions with qubits distributed by B: All
is symmetric with respect to the above (only the
roles ofA andB are exchanged and the BA protocol
message in question is now mCA). If transmission
goes well, A and B know the message mCA, which
was meant only for A.
Betrayal consequences: If C is a traitor, the other part-
ners, who are by definition now loyal, know this imme-
diately, they even do not have to exchange any messages
anymore. If A is a traitor, he may try to fool B by send-
ing him a classical message mAB which is opposite to
mCA. But this is useless, because B knows mCA from
the quantum protocol. It may also happen that the mes-
sages (readable) mCB and mCA B received are not same
i.e., mCB 6= mCA. This is possible only if A filliped C’s
preparation basis (UC ⇆ DC) at the time of preparation
of the Hardy states between B and C in step S1(a). That
is, instead of genuine Hardy states (4) A generates copies
of the following correlation between B and C.
|χ〉 = x00|ud〉+ x01(|ud⊥〉+ |u⊥d〉) + x11|u⊥d⊥〉. (6)
To this end, A employs the measurement {M ′, I rM ′}
instead of {M, I rM}. Here, M ′ = |χ∗〉〈χ∗ | with
|χ∗〉 =x∗00|u〉
(
α∗|u〉+ β∗|u⊥〉)
+ x∗01
[|u〉 (β|u〉 − α|u⊥〉)+ |u⊥〉 (α∗|u〉+ β∗|u⊥〉)]
+ x∗11|u⊥〉
(
β|u〉 − α|u⊥〉) .
In the measurement, if M ′ clicks then the corresponding
pair of maximally entangled states {|Φ+〉12, |Φ+〉34} col-
lapses to a copy of the state |χ〉 shared between B and
C (for detail see step S1(a)):
(M ′13 ⊗ I24)|Φ+〉12|Φ+〉34 = 1
2
|χ∗〉13 ⊗ |χ〉24.
Due to the symmetry of the correlation of |χ〉 general B
reads out a filliped messagem′CB of an opposite bit-value
with respect to what C wanted to convey him. But the
correlations characteristic for |χ〉 cannot reproduce all
the conditions of (1). So, by verifying Hardy’s condition
with C and m′CB 6= mCA partner B can easily find out
that A is the traitor. Note that, since C does not have
any prior knowledge of the correlation links before his
measurements, so he cannot selectively choose different
measurements and convey two different messages to A
and B.
The same holds in the case if B is a traitor. Thus the
traitor has no chance to hide.
A moment of thought allows one to find out that the
protocol works even if there is more than one traitor.
A nice aspect of the protocol is that if one adds one
more round, in which C distributes states for quantum
communication from A to B and then from B to A (two
5rounds), then on similar grounds C may know who of his
subordinate generals is a traitor, if there is any. Thus
one can have even more than it is required in Byzantine
Agreement. Notice further, that the crux of the protocol
is that the communication is kind of completely opposite
to cryptography. It is totally inescapably insecure. And
this is why the protocol works.
Thus, by now we have succeeded in establishing a se-
cure quantum BA protocol for all possible values of q.
According to Ref. [16] for q = qmax the Hardy test (1) is
fully device-independent. Hence, our BA protocol is also
device-independent for q = qmax.
In summary, we have presented a device-independent
quantum protocol for Byzantine Agreement, with any act
of cheating leading to no transmission. It relies on an
ability to establish a quantum link between three part-
ners and perform pairwise Hardy tests between them. In
correspondence to the original concept, the commanding
officer C does not receive any information, as his task is
only to distribute orders. He only accepts qubits, which
carry no information. On the other hand, we put no
restrictions on the amount of the exchange of auxiliary
information.
All the existing quantum protocols are only for de-
tectable BA problem and none of them are for the orig-
inal problem as they are described, since a quantum so-
lution for such a problem is believed to be impossible.
Here we have disproved this belief and presented a device-
independent secure quantum scheme for the problem, as
once the bits mCA and mCB are transmitted (readable
to the receiver) then one must have mCA = mCB. If
correlations observed between all pairs of parties satisfy
Hardy’s conditions (1) then the protocol does not allow
mCA 6= mCB, because any attempt by C to do some-
thing like this results in no transmission, as the message
is unreadable.
Acknowledgments: RR and MZ acknowledge sup-
port by Foundation for Polish Science TEAM
project(TEAM/2011-8/9/styp7) co-financed by EU
European Regional Development Fund and ERC grant
QOLAPS(291348). MW acknowledges support from
the Foundation for Polish Science (project HOMING
PLUS/2011-4/14) and project QUASAR.
[1] M. Pease, R. Shostak, and L. Lamport, J. ACM 27, 228
(1980).
[2] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease, “The Byzantine
Generals Problem”, ACM Trans. Pro-gramming Lan-
guages and Syst. 4, 382 (1982).
[3] M. J. Fischer, N.A. Lynch, and M. Merritt, Distrib. Com-
put. 1, 2639 (1986).
[4] M. Fitzi, J. A. Garay, U. Maurer, and R. Ostrovsky,
“Minimal Complete Primitives for Secure Multi-party
Computation”, Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2001:
Proceedings of the 21-st Annual International Cryptology
Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, 2001, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science (Springer, Berlin, New York, 2001).
[5] M. Fitzi, N. Gisin, and U. Maurer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87,
217901 (2001).
[6] A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 100402 (2002).
[7] A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. A 68, 012304 (2003).
[8] A. Cabello, J. Mod. Opt. 50, 1049 (2003).
[9] S. Iblisdir and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. A 70, 034306 (2004).
[10] S. Gaertner, M. Bourennane, C. Kurtsiefer, A. Cabello,
and H. Weinfurter, Phys. Rev. Lett., 100, 070504 (2008).
[11] M. Bourennane, A. Cabello and M. Z˙ukowski,
arXiv:1001.1947.
[12] L. Hardy, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 2981 (1992).
[13] J. S. Bell, Physics 1, 195 (1964).
[14] G. Kar, Phys. Lett. A 228, 119 (1997).
[15] T. F. Jordan, Phys. Rev. A 50, 62 (1994).
[16] R. Rabelo, L. Y. Zhi, and V. Scarani, Phys. Rev. Lett.
109, 180401(2012).
